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ABSTRACT

The Free Banking Era, noted for numerous bank failures and large
creditor losses, has been traditionally viewed as the experiment in laissezfaire banking that failed.

Current researchers have found evidence

suggesting that bank failures and creditor losses were limited to selected
states and have linked the cause of bank failures to periods of falling asset
prices.

Free banks were required to hold long-term assets as primary

reserves for short-term liabilities.

Current banking theory suggests that

the maturity imbalance between assets and liabilities increases the free
bank's exposure to interest rate risk.

Some states imposed a secondary

reserve, the specie reserve requirement, that partially corrected the
imbalance.
This paper proposes that the link between bank failures and falling
asset prices can be explained in part by one of the regulations imposed on
the free banks.

Six free banking states were selected to test the hypothesis

that the secondary reserve requirement reduced bank failures.

The evidence

indicates that high-specie-reserve states experienced fewer bank failures
than low-specie-reserve states.
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1.

Introduction

Throughout American history the banking industry has been closely
regulated.

From the beginning, restrictions have been imposed on bank entry

and on bank conduct in one form or another.

Generally, bank entry has been

regulated by requiring the entrant to receive a special charter from a state
or federal regulatory body and to meet minimum capital requirements, while
bank conduct has been regulated by placing restrictions on portfolio
selection, demand deposit creation, and capital adequacy.

However, from 1837

to 1863 entry was not determined by the approval of a state or federal body.
This period, known as the Free Banking Era, has been viewed as an experiment
in free - market banking that failed.
a plethora of bank
era.

note ~ and

Historians cite numerous bank failures,

large noteholder losses to be typical of this

Contrary to this view, recent literature has pointed out that the banks

which had been considered free actually operated under several restrictions;
the stories of the numerous bank failures and large noteholder losses were
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limited to only a few states.
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Economists such as Hugh Rockoff [ 3 ] , Arthur Rolnick and Warren Weber
[4, 5, 6, 7] have attempted to explain the causes of the wide variety of
I

banking experiences during this period.

Rockoff contends that certain

restrictions created perverse profit opportunities in which the stockholder
of a free bank could make a quick capital gain on his investment by closing
the bank.

In Rockoff's theory, the capital gain arose from the transfer of

wealth from the creditors to the stockholder when the assets were liquidated.
Rolnick and Weber refute this claim, arguing that term-structure risk brought
about many of the bank failures.

According to Rolnick and Weber the

stockholder closed the bank in order to minimize capital losses.

Both
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theories focused on a reserve requirement that linked the banks' liabilities
to marketable securities; they also disregarded other portfolio restrictions.
This paper examines an alternate restriction, the specie reserve requirement,
and presents evidence suggesting that the lenient restrictions of this
provision strongly influenced bank failure, given the other portfolio
restrictions.
The paper proceeds as follows.

Section 2 contains an historical

overview of the free banking system and the major asset restriction.

A

review of the arguments of Rockoff, Rolnick and Weber are explained in
section 3.

Section 4 contains a discussion of the specie reserve provision

and evidence indicating a link between the leniency of this provision and
banks leaving the market.
data.

Univariate statistical tests are applied to the

In Section 5 the emp efrical results are discussed in light of the

Rolnick and Weber hypothesis.

2.

Section 6 contains the concluding remarks.

Historical Overview

Prior to the Free Banking Era, state legislatures regulated entry and
bank activities through the licen~ ing of individually constructed bank
charters which contained provisions regulating th' activities of the
specified bank.

One such provision, common to all the charters, allowed the

v
banks to issue banknotes; that is, promissory notes circulating as currency.
The banks, however, were required to redeem the banknotes for specie (gold or
silver) on demand.

Failure to do so would have jeopardized charter

privileges.
~

This system of regulating banks by legislative licencing gave way to
the free banking system.

Nineteen states enacted free banking laws; banks in
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these states were "free" to enter the banking market and were subject to
uniform restrictions such as minimum capital requirements.

Unlike the

......

charter banks, the free bank could not print banknotesJ but could obtain
banknotes from the state banking authority by depositing marketable
securities with the state authority.

The state would hold the securities in

reserve for the ultimate redemption of the banknotes.

Like charter banks,

the free banks were required to redeem the banknotes for specie on demand.
If a bank failed to honor the request of a noteholder, the bank would be
required to close and the securities would be sold by the state for the
redemption of the circulating notes.
The free banking states allowed two types of marketable securities as
security for bank notes:
estate.

state bonds and mortgages on unencumbered real

State bonds were allowed by eighteeen states , whereas mortgages

were accepted as security in only a few states.
The amount of banknotes issued by the state banking authorities was
also specified by the laws.

In the early years of free banking legislation,

the states required that notes issued to banks be equal to the par value of
the bonds.

This restriction was known as the par evaluation provision.

Later in the period the states required that the amount of notes issued to
banks be equal to the market value of the bonds or the par value, whichever
was less.

A few states placed stronger restrictions by limiting note issue

to less than 100 percent of the market value of the bonds.
Mortgages were treated differently than state bonds.

1

In general, a

mortgage was eligible as collateral if the mortgage value was no more than
half the market value of the mortgaged land.

The amount of notes issued by

the authorities could not exceed the mortgage value.

I
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In addition to the market security requirement, some states enacted a
specie reserve requirement.

The restriction required banks to hold specie

equal to a specified percentage of the amount of notes in circulation.

2

In

general, the restrictions specified that the required amount of specie was to
be on hand at all times, but some of the states allowed the required amount
of specie to be the average specie holdings for a specified period.
Although the market security and specie reserve provisions were enacted
with the intent of protecting the noteholders of the free bank from losses,
the evidence seems to indicate that large losses were experienced in several
states.

The critics have claimed that these losses were a result of the free

competition among banks.

Economic historian Bray Hammond, a representative

of this group, states that "Free banking was an application of laissez faire
to the monetary function. 113

Such association, however, is unwarranted, since

the free banks were subject to various restrictions.

Current researchers

have reexamined the restrictions imposed on free banks and have concluded
that some of the restrictions imposed on free banks influenced banking
behavior.

3.

Current Theories

Hugh Rockoff was one of the first to reexamine the free bank experience
and to develop a theory on the impact of free bank restrictions on the free
bank market.

Rockoff found states that enacted the par evaluation

restriction experienced a large number of bank failures and large noteholder
losses.

He also found that subsequent changes in the restriction from par

evaluation to market evaluation reduced bank failures and noteholder losses.

7

From this evidence, Rockoff

theorized,~ hat

under certain circumstances

the free bank investor in par evaluation states could make a quick capital
gain by closing the bank.

When the market value of the eligible security was

below the par value of the security, the free bank investor would receive
banknotes in an amount greater than his investment.

The free bank investor

could make a quick capital gain by issuing all the banknotes, presumably
through a loan to himself or to a relative, then close the bank and leave
town.

This scenario, however, would have been possible only if the free

--

bank investor had been able to convince the public to accept and hold the
'--

banknotes at face value.

Thus, the unsuspecting noteholder would have been

holding banknotes that were not fully backed, and would have received only
the market value of the securities, while the free bank investor would have
received a capital gain on his investment equal to the difference between the
par value and the market value of the securities.
However, Rolnick and Weber also reviewed the free banking experience
/

and found e vidence that refutes Rockoff's hypothesis.

Although they did not

deny that there were frequent bank failures and large noteholder losses
-iwtt+rin some states, they rejected the hypothesis that the minor
specifications in the laws caused free bank failures and noteholder losses.

/

Rolnick and Weber presented an alternative theory which suggested that
economic disturbances may have contributed to the bank failures and to the
noteholder losses.
According to Rolnick and Weber, a major drop in asset prices would have
been suffic i ent to generate a run on the banks and would have possib l y forced
some of the banks to close.

As a proxy for asset prices, Roln i ck and Weber

used bond prices to measure economic activity.

Their reasoning was that

bonds we re primarily used as collateral for note issue and in most cases

8
bonds were a large portion of the free bank's asset portfolio.

A drop in

bond prices would have lowered the market value of the bonds backing the
notes as well as lowered the value of the free bank assets.

If noteholders

perceived that the drop in bond prices was large enough to jeopardize the
solvency of the bank, they would have gone to the bank and attempted to
redeem their notes at par value.

The bank would not have honored the request

if the noteholders were correct in their assessment.

To honor the request

would have meant an additional capital investment by the bank's stockholders.
Instead the stockholders of the bank would have allowed the notes to be
protested and the bank to close.

Consequently, the bonds would have been

sold by the state banking authorities at a price below the original purchase
price and the noteholders would have been paid off at some fraction of the
face value of the note.
Even if the noteholders were wrong in their assessment of the financial
position of the bank, the banker still could have been forced to close the
bank in order to liquidate some of the assets.

Rolnick and Weber suggested

that some of the solvent banks may have closed permanently rather than
continue to operate under such turbulent conditions.
The Rolnick and Weber study contends that the market security provision

I

increased the interest rate risk exposure of the free banks' portfolio.

Of

course, interest, rate risk of any portfolio depends on all the assets of the
portfolio.

The free banker could have used his banknotes to purchase

perfectly riskless assets such as specie, thereby reducing the probability of
default on note redemption to zero.

As the banker reduced the percentage of

notes backed by specie the probability of default increased.

In other words,

the specie reserve provided security against interest rate risk of the market

9
securities backing the notes and reduced the probability of banks leaving the
market.

4.

The Specie Reserve Provision

The specie reserve requirements of six free banking states are
examined in this section:
and Louisiana.

4

New York, Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Virginia,

These states represent a cross-section of specie reserve

requirements and experiences.
The specie reserve requirements enacted by these states varied from a
zero to a thirty-three percent specie reserve requirement.

Virginia and

Louisiana represent states that enacted high specie reserve requirements greater than or equal to 20 percent.

5

New York and Indiana represent states

that enacted, and later repealed, 12 1/2 percent specie reserve reqirements.
The repeal came shortly after the original enactment.

Minnesota and

Wisconsin represent states that never enacted a specie reserve requirement
during the free banking period.
The experiences varied from no bank failures and noteholder losses to
numerous bank failures and large noteholder losses.

Information concerning

I

the experiences in each state was obtained from state auditor reports that
the banks prepared for the state banking authorities.

6

The number of banks

that entered and exited was collected from these reports.
were divided into two classes:

Banks that exited

banks that closed and banks that failed.

A

closed bank was defined as a bank that was able to redeem its banknotes at
par (i.e., no noteholder losses) whereas a failed bank was defined as a bank
that was unable to redeem its notes at par (i.e., noteholders suffered
losses).

A detailed listing of each bank that operated in a given state was

10

made and the tabulation of all closing and failing banks was compiled from
this list.

The following discussion presents the final compilation for each

state.

4.1

The Experiences of the States

Initial support for the hypothesis that a lenient specie reserve
requirement increased the incidence of bank exits is revealed by the data
presented in Table 1.

(Since the the size of the banking markets varied from

state to state, the number of banks that operated under each law in each
state and the percentage of operating banks that left the market for each
state are also included in Table 1.)
The aggregate experience for each state indicates that exits were
generally higher in zero percent specie reserve states than in high specie
reserve states.

The high specie reserve states, Virginia and Louisiana,

record the fewest number of banks leaving the market.

In the 12 1/2 percents

specie reserve states, the evidence shows conflicting experiences.
experienced a large number of bank exits, while New York
bank exits.

Indiana

experienced few

This result also holds after adjusting for market size.

In the

states that did not enact a specie reserve requirement, the number of banks
leaving the market were the highest among the states examined.

Even after

adjusting for market size, these states had the highest percentages of bank
exits, recording at least 30 percent of the operating banks leaving the
market.
The states are also grouped according to the laws under which they
operated and are presented in Table 2.

In this table the number of free

banks that operated in the market under each provision is indicated along

11
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TABLE 1
ENTRY AND EXIT IN SELECTED FREE BANKING STATES
(1)

State

Reserve
Requirement

Date

Indiana

Total
Operated

(2)
Total
Closed

(3)
Total
Failed

(4)
Total
Exited

(4) 7 (1)
Percentage
Exited

1856-1863

0%

23

6

1

7

30.4%

Minnesota 1857-1863

0%

16

2

9

11

68.8%

New Yorka 1841-1863

0%

426

122

31

153

35.9%

Wisconsin 1842-1863

0%

140

42

37

79

56.4%
59.1%

Indiana

b

1852-1855

12 1 /2%

93

32

23

55

1838-1840

12 1/2%

74

2

3

5

6.80%

1851-1860

20%

23

4

0

4

17.40%

Louisiana 1853-1859

33%

7

0

0

0

0.0%

New York
Virginia

b

aThe New York tally does not include charter banks that entered under the free
banking law after their charter expired. Information on the redemption rates of
four New York banks was not available and is not included in the number of banks
exiting.
b

Information on twenty-seven Indiana banks was not available and is not included in
the number of banks exiting.

/
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TABLE 2

FREE BANK EXPERIENCES GROUPED ACCORDING TO
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
Specie Reserve Requirement

Experience

Free Bank Operated

0%

12 1/2%

605

167

20% and Above
30

Percentage Closed

28.4%

20.3%

13.3%

Percentage Failed

12.9%

15.6%

0.0%

Percentage Exited

41.3%

35.9%

13.3%

I
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with the percentage of banks that closed, the percentage that failed and the
percentage of banks that left the market.

As in Table 1, the figures

indicate that the banks operating under the more lenient zero percent
requirement had a higher percentage of banks leaving the market than those
operating under the stricter requirements.

These figures combined with those

in Table 1 appear to indicate that differing specie reserve requirements
among the states could explain the number of banks leaving the market.

4.2

Univariate Test

The notion that differing specie reserve requirements explains exits is
strengthened by the results of a univariate test performed on the data.

The

evidence in the previous section indicates that a larger percentage of banks
left the market under a lenient specie reserve requirement than under a
strong specie reserve requirement.

Since the evidence is represented as

proportions, the appropriate test is the difference between two sample

.

proportions.

7

Three variables were constructed for the test:
closure rate, and the below par rate.

the failure rate, the

The failure rate is defined as the

number of banks that failed divided by the number of banks that operated
under the particular restriction.

This variable measures the percentage of

all existing banks that were failures.

Using this percentage facilitates

comparisons between states having different numbers of banks.
The closure rate is defined as the number of banks that closed divided
by the number of banks that operated during the free banking period.

As with

the failure rate closing banks are divided by operating banks to facilitate
comparison across states.

This variable measures the percentage of all

14

existing banks that closed.

Both the failure rate and closure rate are

constructed in order to isolate the effects of the specie reserve provision
on banks exiting the market.
The below par rate is defined as the number of failures divided by the
number of banks that exited.

This variable measures the percentage of banks

that were leaving the market that failed.

The purpose of this variable is to

indicate the effects that different specie reserve restrictions had on the
likelihood that an exiting bank would be a failure.
The observations for each variable are categorized under three specie
restrictions:

Zero percent, Twelve percent, and Twenty percent and Above.

(Let zero, twelve, and twenty and above be assigned group numbers 1, 2, 3,
respectively, and let the sample proportion of group i be denoted as X.• )
l.

·Since it is expected that a lenient specie reserve would result in a larger
number of failures, the hypothesis tested is that the mean of the failure
rate, closure rate, and below-par rate under a zero specie reserve is
significantly larger than the means of the twelve percent or the twenty
percent and above specie requirements:

Hl

xl - x 2 < 0,

H2

xl - x 3 < 0, and

H3

x2 - x 3< 0,

1
1

1

where Hj is the jth hypothesis being tested.
1

Alternately, the null

hypothesis states that there is no difference between the proportions.
The results of the tests, given in Table 3, indicate that there is a
significant difference in the failure rates between states that enacted
"'t.

specie reserve requirements less than and equal to twelve percent, and states

15
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that enacted specie reserve requirements of twenty percent and above.

Both

the sample proportions of zero percent and twelve percent are significantly
larger than the sample proportions of twenty percent and above at the 99
percent and 95 percent significance level, respectively.

However, the null

hypothesis cannot be rejected for the difference in proportions of zero and
twelve percent specie reserve.
The evidence on the closure rate in Table 3 also indicates a
significant difference between the zero percent, and the twelve and twenty
and above reserve requirement at the 95 percent significance level and at the
99 percent significance level, respectively.

The null hypotheses cannot be

rejected for the difference in proportions of twelve percent and twenty
percent and above.
Finally, the test on the below-par rate indicates that the specie
reserve does not show a significant difference in the likelihood that an
exiting bank will fail; that is the null hypotheses cannot be rejected.
In summary, the evidence supports the previous conclusion that the
enactment of a high specie reserve requirement reduced bank failures and
closures.

A bank that existed under a strong specie reserve restriction was

less likely to fail or close than a bank that existed under a lenient specie

I

reserve requirement.

In both tests the twelve percent specie reserve proved

to be a critical point in specie holdings.

A specie reserve greater than

twelve percent appeared to reduce the number of failures while a specie
reserve of twelve percent and lower significantly increased the number of

16
TABLE 3

DIFFERENCES IN FAILURE RATES, CLOSURE RATES, AND BELOW PAR-RATES
MEASURES UNDER SPECIE RESERVE REQUIREMENTS

Measure

Comparison of Specie Reserve Reqirements
0% &
12 1 /2%

Differences in
Failure Rates

i.

t Ratio

Closure Rates

%

t Ratio

Below-Par Rates

%

t Ratio

-2.7
-0. 762

8 .1

2.35**

-11.9
-1.57

*-

significant at the 1% level.

**-

significant at the 5% level.

0% &
20 & Above
12.9

12 1/2%
20 & Above
15.6

3 .27*

15.1

2.21**

7.0

3.96*

1.00

31.22

43.3

1.34

I

1.73
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closures.

However, there was no significant difference in the likelihood

that an exiting bank failed.

This result is not surprising since the

likelihood of a bank failing or closing also depends on the current market
conditions.

The effects of market conditions on banks exiting under

different specie reserve requirements are analyzed in the next section.

5.

Comparison with the Rolnick and Weber Hypothesis

The analysis in the preceding section indicated that there may have
been some link between the number of banks leaving the market in a particular
state and the type of specie reserve requirement that the state required.
One explanation of this link is that the specie reserves helped reduce the
risk of default associated with an economic downturn.

The specie reserve

could have helped free bankers meet unanticipated demands for specie that may
have been initiated by the fall in bond prices.

The reserves could have also

offset noteholder losses from the bonds, devaluation.
The reason for the specie reserve's influence is clear.

Since the

price elasticity with respect to the change in interest rates is larger for a
long term asset than a short term liability, a decrease in the interest rate
would result in a larger depreciation of the assets than the liabilities.
Consequently, a large drop in interest rates, as Rolnick and Weber suggested,
would induce noteholders to redeem their notes.

If the free banker correctly

anticipated a change in asset prices or effectively adjusted his portfolio to
meet the change in demand for specie, he could have prevented a suspension of
specie redemption.

Therefore, by requiring free bankers to back a portion of

the banknotes in specie, the downside risk from falling bond prices could
have been partially mitigated.

18

In addition, noteholders in high specie reserve states may not have
reacted to a fall in bond prices, since the specie holdings may have covered
the bond depreciation.

8

If noteholders disregarded this information and

attempted to redeem their banknotes, the bank may have been forced to suspend
specie payments and forced into liquidation.

As long as the depreciation of

bonds was less than the specie holdings, noteholders would not have suffered
losses; the bank would have had sufficient specie to cover the loss in asset
value.
This explanation does not refute the hypothesis proposed by Rolnick and
Weber_,,?;;'h at noteholders may have reacted to changes in bond prices, but it
does contend that falling bond prices may not necessarily be the only factor
determining bank failures.

The specie reserve requirement may have been a

factor in determining bank failures and closures.

To check this hypothesis

the sample of state experiences was examined under falling bond price periods
as specified in the Rolnick and Weber study.
Table 4.

10

9

The raw data is presented in

There were 135 banks identified as exiting during a falling bond

price period.

The break'ti own of banks that exited indicates that there were

sixty-two bank failures under the zero specie reserve, twelve under the
twelve percent specie reserve during the falling bond price period.
The number of failures and closures as a percentage of the total number
of banks that exited is shown in Table 4.

It indicates that a larger

percentage of exiting banks failed under the lenient specie reserve
requirements than under the strict specie reserve requirements.
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that a lenient specie

These

----
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TABLE 4

BANK EXITS UNDER FALLING BOND PRICES AND
SPECIE RESERVE REQUIREMENTS

Reserve Requirements
0%

12 1 /2%

Total Operated

605

167

30

Total Exited

108

23

4

Total Failed

62

12

0

(57.4)

Total Closed

46

11

(42.6)

( )

(52.1)

Percentage of total exited

I

(47.9)

20% and Above

(0 .o)

4
(100)
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reserve requirement, given the market security restriction, may have
increased the number of failures.

However, further testing is necessary

before any conclusive statement can be made about the effects of a specie
reserve requirement on bank failures.

6.

Conclusion

The evidence indicates that a specie reserve requirement influences
bank closings and bank failures.

States enacting a strong specie reserve

requirement showed a significant difference in bank failings and closings
from states that enacted -lenient specie reserve requirements.

This study

suggests that the discrepancy in experiences between states with different
specie reserve requirements may be due to a link between the short term
liability (i.e. banknotes) and the long term asset (i.e. state bonds).

This

hypothesis implies that the free banknotes made up a substantial portion of a
free bank's liabilities; hence, state bonds were a substantial portion of a
free bank's assets.

Therefore, in order to make a conclusive statement about

the influence of the specie reserve requirement on free banking experience,
more information is needed on the portfolios of the individual free bank.

I
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FOOTNOTES

1
The number of statutes does not necessarily indicate the. number of
restrictions imposed on the free bank.

For example, Tennessee enacted

sixteen statutes but these statutes contained the same number of restrictions
as New York's which contained thirty-three statutes.
2

Louisiana enacted a reserve requirement that required banks to hold specie

or ninety day commercial paper equal to 100% of the notes in circulation.
3

Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America From the Revolution to the Civil

War, (Princeton, N.J.:
4

Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 573.

virginia's free banking law required a legislative charter and approval.

Therefore, some may not consider Virginia a free banking state.

However, the

charters were uniform in requirements, except for the minimum capital
requirement.

In addition, the historical records of Virginia indicate that

the legislature did not refuse any requests and that a significant number of
charters did not go into operation.

Contemporaries have claimed that the

v
legislative approval was no different than the state banking authority
accepting applications.
5

See [ 1] for additional informa.tion.

In Louisiana, banks were required to hold one hundred percent of their

outstanding notes in specie

~r

90 day commercial paper.

In addition to the

reserve requirement backing banknotes, Louisiana banks were required to hold
33 percent of their deposits in specie.

Since the noteholders i n Louisiana

free banks had first lien on the assets, and in general the amount of
deposits equaled or exceeded note issue, the note issued by the Louisiana
bankers were backed by thirty-three percent specie reserves.
Louisiana's free banks left the market.

None of

24

6
Most of the reports can be found in the United States Congressional Serial
Set [8].

Additional information was obtained from state auditor reports (See

[6]).
7

The appropriate test statistic is:

where S
pl-

Pz

is the standard error of the difference between two sample

proportions:

'\! ~ ~

[(nl + n2)/nln2],

A

and p is the expected proportion of the combined sample and q is the
complement of p.
8

The free banking laws also contained a provision that allowed the state

banking authority to call in banknotes when the market value of the
securities was less than the amount of notes issued.

The noteholder would

also have the assurance that corrective measures would be taken.
9

This study includes the first part of the N.Y. experience; the Rolnick and

Weber study did not.
1

~ test on proportions cannot be used in this analysis.

Since the data is

divided into time segments, the base number of banks operating /8ries in each
time segment.

